Editorial
Front Page - Friday, December 17, 2010
Case Digests: Tennesse Court of Appeals Syllabus
Fieldstone Farms Home-owners Association, et al. v. Cavender Enterprises, LLC
Williamson County – The trial court found that a parcel designated as a recreational facility in a planned unit development was a “lot” under the terms of the governing declarations such that it could not be subdivided or subjected to a revised use.
Under the original declaration, the recreational parcel was expressly excluded within the definition of lot but the later supplemented declaration omits the exclusion.
Finding that according to
its terms the Supplementary Declaration could not conflict with the original declaration, we find the parcel was not included within the definition of lot. Consequently, it is not subject to the restrictions placed on lots.
As there is no prohibition to subdivision or conversion to residential use in the documents governing the parcel, then the parcel may be subdivided and converted to residential use. Accordingly, the trial court is reversed.
Jessica Hooper McQuade (now Burnett) v. Michael Vincent McQuade
Montgomery County – This is a divorce appeal involving subject matter jurisdiction. The parties, the parents of one minor child, resided in Tennessee when divorce proceedings were initiated in the Tennessee trial court.
The trial court entered a pendente lite order designating the father as the child’s primary residential parent and setting the mother’s child support obligation.
Before the trial, a special master made a recommendation on the mother’s child support obligation.
In May 2008, after a trial, the Tennessee trial court entered an order declaring the parties divorced and designating the father as primary residential parent, but did not rule on child support. By the time of the divorce order, both parties had moved to Kentucky.
Almost immediately afterward, the mother filed an objection regarding the amount of her child support obligation, and the Tennessee trial court entered an order temporarily modifying her child support.
In February 2009, the mother filed a petition to modify the designation of primary residential parent. The Tennessee trial court conducted a hearing on the mother’s objection to the amount of child support and her petition to modify the designation of primary residential parent.
It declined to change the designation of primary residential parent, and also held that the mother owed no back child support arrearage. Both parties appeal.
We hold that, under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, the Tennessee trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the mother’s petition to change the designation of primary residential parent.
We also hold that, under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the mother’s request for modification of child support.
Therefore, we vacate the trial court’s orders modifying the parenting plan and modifying child support.
John Gallon, et al. v. Harry Elberson, et al.
Sumner County – The plaintiff home buyers filed suit against two home inspectors and a home inspection company after discovering defects in the home that were not mentioned in the inspection report.
The court found that the defendants were negligent and granted the plaintiffs a judgment for damages against the home inspectors and the inspection company, individually, jointly and severally.
The defendants argue on appeal that the judgment was not supported by the evidence and that in holding them individually liable, the court pierced the corporate veil without the proof of the extraordinary circumstances normally required for a court to do so.
We affirm the finding of liability and the judgment for damages, but we vacate the judgment as to one of the individual defendants, because the evidence preponderated against the trial court’s finding that he was in partnership with the other individual defendant.
Wondimu Borena v. Yellow Cab Metro, Inc., et al.
Davidson County – The former attorney for the plaintiff, who is seeking to recover a contingency fee pursuant to an attorney’s lien she filed after her services were terminated, filed this appeal challenging the trial court’s finding that the parties did not enter into a binding settlement agreement and the involuntary dismissal of the underlying personal injury action.
The action was dismissed because the pro se plaintiff did not comply with orders of the court. The plaintiff’s former attorney claims she has the independent right to enforce a settlement she negotiated, but which her client rejected, in order to recover a fee.
The pro se plaintiff also seeks to set aside the involuntary dismissal of his case.
Finding no merit to the arguments asserted on appeal, we affirm the trial court in all respects.
Charles Truax v. Memphis Light Gas & Water Division
Shelby County – Plaintiff filed a cause of action asserting breach of contract and violation of the Tennessee Human Rights Acts.
The trial court awarded summary judgment to Defendant Memphis Light Gas & Water Division based on the applicable statute of limitations.
We affirm.
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