Editorial
Front Page - Friday, January 28, 2011
Case Digests: Tennesse Court of Appeals Syllabus
Open Lake Sporting Club v. Lauderdale Haywood Angling Club.
Lauderdale County – This appeal involves a dispute over the location of a boundary line between tracts of land owned by two hunting clubs. After many years of litigation, the parties agreed that a new survey would be conducted by a new surveyor and that they would be bound by his decision. After the new surveyor filed a report and survey, one of the clubs filed a motion to set aside the survey, contending that the new surveyor did not make an independent determination regarding the location of the boundary line, but rather, copied a previous survey that was completed in the past. The trial judge refused to hold a hearing regarding the validity of the survey because the parties had agreed to be bound by the surveyor’s decision. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Betty Rose v. Cookeville Regional Medical Center Authority.
Putnam County – Plaintiff, a lactation consultant formerly employed by Cookeville Regional Medical Center, sued the hospital for common law retaliatory discharge and violation of the Tennessee Public Protection Act; plaintiff also asserted a claim for punitive damages. The case was tried before a jury. At the close of plaintiff’s proof, the court granted the Medical Center’s motion for directed verdict on the Protection Act and punitive damages claims; the common law retaliatory discharge claim was allowed to proceed to the jury. The jury found for the Medical Center. Plaintiff appeals, asserting error in the trial court’s grant of directed verdict and its rulings on evidentiary issues. Finding no error, we affirm.
Robert D. Gray v. Andy Roten, II and Gary B. Roten.
Shelby County – This case involves an accident between a bicycle and a pick-up truck. Appellant was struck by Appel-lee’s truck when Appellant failed to obey a stop sign and rode his bicycle into traffic. The trial court found that Appellant was sixty percent at fault for the accident, and, pursuant to a comparative fault analysis, entered judgment for Appellee. On appeal, we find that the trial court erred in applying a pedestrian statute to a bicyclist, but that this error was harmless in light of our finding that Appellant was negligent per se in failing to obey the stop sign, and/or in failing to yield to oncoming traffic. We conclude that the evidence preponderates in favor of the trial court’s finding that Appellant was at least sixty percent at fault so as to foreclose any recovery under a comparative fault analysis. Affirmed for the reasons discussed herein.
In Re: Destiny S.
Scott County - Hank P. (“Father”) is the biological father of Destiny S. (“the “Child”). After the Child was removed from Father’s home in 2006, the Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) eventually filed a petition to terminate his parental rights to the Child. Following a trial, the Juvenile Court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to terminate Father’s parental rights pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(g)(2) and (g)(3). The Juvenile Court also found that the evidence established clearly and convincingly that it was in the best interest of the Child for Father’s parental rights to be terminated. Father appeals challenging these findings as well as an evidentiary ruling and the Juvenile Court Judge’s refusal to recuse himself. We affirm the Juvenile Court’s judgment.
In Re: Conservatorship of Goldie Childs.
Davidson County – Two of the daughters of an eighty-two year old woman filed a petition to be named as their mother’s Conservator. The trial court found that the mother did indeed need a Conservator, but because of family disagreements it appointed a third party to perform that role. Seven months later, the same daughters filed a petition to remove the incumbent Conservator and to be named as Co-Conservators to replace her. The mother died after proceedings on the second petition began, but before the trial court could rule on its merits. The Conservator subsequently moved the court for payment of her fees. The court found that some of those fees were incurred as a direct result of the uncooperative acts of the two daughters. Since the decedent’s estate was indigent, the court entered two money judgments for costs against the daughters. We reverse the judgment that was assessed against one of the daughters for failing to return her mother to the nursing home in a timely way, because although her actions led to additional costs, no legal basis for the judgment appears in the record. We vacate the judgment based on the unsuccessful petition to remove the conservator and we remand the case for further proceedings, because although Tenn. Code Ann. § 34-1-114 does allow an assessment of costs against such petitioners, it is unclear how much of the court’s judgment falls within the parameters of that statute.
|
|